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Abstract 
This paper introduces the social self-restriction (SSR) model, which highlights a drawback 
associated with the increasingly accessible privilege of social autonomy. Social autonomy 
enables individuals to connect with preferred social partners and avoid undesirable others. The 
benefits of social autonomy are undeniable; however, the SSR model makes the novel assertion 
that people tend to exercise social autonomy in ways that ultimately constrain their potential for 
social empowerment—a higher-order form of personal freedom. Attaining the ideal of high 
social empowerment requires both high social autonomy and high social adaptability. People 
with high social adaptability can feel reasonably comfortable and act competently in social 
environments they did not choose to inhabit. Unfortunately, people with high social autonomy 
are unlikely to possess high social adaptability. We propose that social autonomy undermines 
social adaptability by tempting people to avoid social challenges and socialize selectively with 
similar others in familiar contexts, a habit that limits social skill development, promotes social 
intolerance, and distorts social perceptions. In essence, we argue that social autonomy allows 
people to live in their social comfort zones, at the cost of restricting their social range. Our 
discussion of the SSR model incorporates evidence and perspectives from a broad range of 
academic disciplines, and includes consideration of opportunities for future research. 
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Social Autonomy ≠ Social Empowerment: The Social Self-restriction Model 
 Social interactions surely comprise a substantial percentage of the most enjoyable and 
meaningful experiences in people’s lives. Unfortunately, social interactions are also the root of 
many of people’s most unpleasant life experiences. If individuals were given more autonomy to 
control the circumstances of their social encounters, hedonic motivations should usually lead 
them to increase the frequency of their pleasant social experiences and reduce the likelihood of 
uncomfortable social experiences (see review by Denrell, 2005). In this paper, we provide 
evidence suggesting that social autonomy has indeed become more accessible, and people are 
predictably using their social autonomy to locate and connect with appealing others while 
reducing their exposure to unwanted interactions. This historically unprecedented privilege of 
social choice is enviable, as possessing autonomy of one form or another has repeatedly been 
shown to predict various positive outcomes for health and happiness (see Deci & Ryan, 2002, 
2012). Still, the freedom individuals have to control their social situations is not inevitably and 
unconditionally beneficial for well-being (e.g., Hsee & Hastie, 2006; Markus & Schwartz, 2010; 
Schwartz, 2000). This paper highlights a critical drawback of autonomy in a social context that 
has largely escaped attention in the psychological literature. We introduce the concept of social 
self-restriction (SSR), the paradoxical process by which people use their social autonomy in 
ways that ultimately restrict their perceived and real ability to explore, appreciate, and benefit 
from the full range of viable social environments available to them.  
The SSR model integrates evidence and perspectives from a broad range of academic 
disciplines, including social and personality psychology, developmental and health psychology, 
sociology, urban studies, and communication. It proposes that social empowerment can be 
constrained, paradoxically, by the exercise of social autonomy. In particular, when people 
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succeed in limiting their social experience to interactions with similar and familiar others, the 
rare experience or even the prospect of interacting with less familiar or dissimilar others becomes 
less comfortable and more threatening—an outcome that strengthens people’s inclination to find 
their kind and wall off all others. The result of this sequence is a tradeoff: People get to spend a 
higher proportion of their social time with appealing people in unthreatening contexts, but they 
sacrifice some of their ability to function optimally in situations they do not control. In short, we 
propose that social empowerment gained through enhanced social autonomy is at least partially 
offset by social empowerment lost through reduced social adaptability caused by the social 
choices people make. 
SSR Model Components and Predictions 
The SSR model boils down to an examination of factors and processes that affect social 
empowerment. We introduce the construct of social empowerment to describe an individual’s 
self-perceived and objective ability to feel reasonably comfortable and operate competently in a 
broad array of social environments. High social empowerment includes social self-efficacy 
derived from social competencies developed through prior exposure to a diversity of social 
contexts. People who attain high levels of social empowerment are free to explore and benefit 
from the full range of potentially worthwhile social habitats, because they possess the 
experience, skills, and mindset necessary to accurately assess and respond appropriately to 
different social circumstances. In contrast, people with low social empowerment are constrained 
to social interactions within comparatively narrow boundaries. Within these boundaries, people 
with low social empowerment might be able to socialize efficaciously and could even have a 
thriving social life; however, they do not feel free to roam beyond their social comfort zones. 
According to the SSR model, the level of a person’s social empowerment depends on the status 
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of two subcomponents: social autonomy and social adaptability. High social empowerment 
cannot be achieved without high social autonomy and high social adaptability. The SSR model 
builds upon the foundation of this premise.  
In our use of the term, social autonomy describes individuals’ capacity to personally 
manage their exposure to other people. In other words, social autonomy allows people to 
selectively choose and avoid social partners and contexts. Social autonomy describes the 
objective realities of social opportunity and control; it varies according to the presence or 
absence of social options and constraints in a particular place at a particular time. Social 
autonomy is not defined by a state of mind; having social autonomy may or may not imbue a 
corresponding subjective sense of personal freedom or self-determination. Some people have 
more social autonomy than others, but social autonomy is not a skill or a feature of people’s 
temperament or disposition. Instead, social autonomy requires access to a sufficiently large and 
diverse population of potential social partners, and to the tools that enable selective control over 
one’s exposure to potential social partners.  
  The second subcomponent of social empowerment, social adaptability, describes an 
individual’s real and perceived ability to operate comfortably and competently in a range of 
social environments not selected or otherwise controlled by that individual. Social adaptability 
involves tolerance for less-than-ideal social circumstances and willingness and ability to make 
appropriate self-adjustments in response to those circumstances. Thus, social adaptability 
encompasses the capacity of individuals to function reasonably well in challenging social 
environments they cannot easily regulate. Social adaptability is an expression of social 
competence, but a person could be said to have social competence without social adaptability if 
their competence was confined to a particular social habitat. Social adaptability can be 
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characterized as an index of social comfort and competence portability. A person’s social 
adaptability depends somewhat on the situational context, but it relies even more on skill-like 
qualities of the person that can gradually grow or wither through life experiences.  
Social autonomy and social adaptability could hypothetically be independent, orthogonal 
elements of social empowerment. However, as we will show, the evidence suggests that social 
autonomy leads people to avoid social challenges through selective socializing—behavior that 
ultimately harms their social adaptability.1 Because social empowerment depends upon both 
social autonomy and social adaptability, an increase in an individual’s capacity to wield social 
autonomy may not translate into an increase in that individual’s social empowerment. Given that 
high social autonomy and high social adaptability are unlikely to coexist, sacrificing some social 
adaptability in exchange for an increase in social autonomy may or may not be a worthwhile 
tradeoff. 
 To clarify, our message that social autonomy undercuts a dimension of social 
empowerment should be interpreted as an observation of behavioral reality, not as a prescription 
for behavior change. It would be difficult to refute the perspective that more social 
empowerment is better than less, but the ideal ratio of autonomy to adaptability is open to debate. 
The SSR model makes no claims about the relative importance of social autonomy versus social 
adaptability. We argue that rising social autonomy is causing a decline in social adaptability, but 
do not claim this is a problem that requires fixing. Our advocacy is limited to raising awareness 
of psychological phenomena that have previously escaped attention.  
In summary, the whole of the SSR model includes a philosophical proposition (our 
assertion that social empowerment derives from the combination of social autonomy and social 
adaptability) and a set of concrete, testable hypotheses specifying the relationship between social 
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autonomy and social adaptability. Figure 1 displays the testable predictions of the SSR model. 
We predict a negative relationship between the predictor variable of social autonomy and the 
dependent variable of social adaptability: Individuals who consistently exercise social autonomy 
should be more prone to exhibiting underdeveloped or eroded social adaptability. This 
relationship can be explained by social challenge avoidance: Social autonomy predicts social 
challenge avoidance, which predicts diminished social adaptability. These predictions are 
qualified by trait and state determinants of social challenge avoidance, which could strengthen or 
weaken the predicted relationship between social autonomy and social challenge avoidance.2  
The paragraphs that follow elaborate on the nuances of the model and the evidence on 
which it is based. We start with a review of the technological innovations that have given more 
people more social autonomy. Then we describe the details of how and why social autonomy 
decreases social adaptability. Finally, we differentiate the SSR model from prior research and 
consider opportunities for new research derived from the SSR model.  
Innovations Enabling Social Autonomy 
Throughout history, relationships have been highly constrained by geography. In the past, 
a person’s social autonomy was strongly dependent on the quantity and diversity of people in 
close physical proximity. People living in places packed with people had different social options 
to choose from, but they could not easily avoid undesirable social contact. People living in 
sparsely populated places could avoid undesirable social contact more easily, but they did not 
have many options for social partners.  
Today, physical proximity (i.e., propinquity) remains a major predictor of relationship 
initiation and maintenance (e.g., Hipp & Perrin, 2009; Liben-Nowell, Novak, Kumar, Raghavan, 
& Tomkins, 2005; Reagans, 2011), but the relevance of physical proximity for social autonomy 
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has been diminished, first by the emergence of the telephone and motor vehicles, and more 
recently by the revolution of internet-based communication and social media platforms 
(Cairncross, 2001; Chua, Madej, & Wellman, 2011; Rice, Shepherd, Dutton, & Katz, 2007). The 
availability of new tools for communication and transportation has given people unprecedented 
power to find and connect with desirable social partners while avoiding undesirable social 
contact.  
Many people can now routinely access social bridging tools that allow them to transcend 
physical distance in selectively establishing and maintaining desirable social connections.3 For 
example, social media websites such as Facebook, Instagram, and eHarmony help individuals 
find and filter prospective social partners regardless of where these other people might happen to 
be. If face-to-face interaction is a priority, people today can still make this happen despite living 
many miles away from the people they want to visit, thanks to the invention of cars, trains, 
airplanes, and the infrastructure that supports these space-shrinking travel options. People can 
now viably choose to live in relative isolation from the physical presence of others without 
surrendering their ability to have substantive social interactions in person or otherwise (Glaeser 
& Kahn, 2004; Jackson, 1985). 
As options for self-directed social bridging have proliferated, a parallel trend benefitting 
social autonomy has emerged: People today can often avoid unintentional social exposure 
whether they are at home or traveling, even if they are not extremely wealthy or do not live in 
sparsely populated places (Atkinson & Flint, 2004; Goldberger, 1996; Graham & Marvin, 2001). 
People have always had some access to “involvement shields” (Goffman, 1966) that allow a 
degree of detachment from the surrounding social environment, but the arsenal of available 
shields has been significantly bolstered. Part of the increase in people’s ability to avoid 
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accidental social exposure can be traced to international trends in the design of the built 
environment over the past 50 years that have made urban and suburban spaces more private (e.g., 
Bagaeen & Uduku, 2010; Graham & Marvin, 2001). But the most prominent new options for 
avoiding unwanted social contact emerged from the same communication and transportation 
advancements that spawned new options for connecting with others not physically present.   
People in public now routinely attach themselves to portable personal electronic devices 
that make them inattentive and inaccessible to the people in sight (Gergen, 2002; Hampton, 
Livio, & Sessions, 2010; Katz, Lever, & Chen, 2008; Turkle, 2008). Much attention has been 
paid to the ways that electronic devices harm privacy by reducing people’s ability to block their 
personal information from being accessed by remote others, but these devices have also bolstered 
the type of privacy defined by one’s ability to ignore and deflect others physically present in 
one’s immediate surrounding environment. As Sunstein (2015) observed, information network 
structures in modern society have shifted from an “architecture of serendipity” toward a self-
selecting “architecture of control.”  
Cars and equivalent forms of automotive transportation provide another formidable 
involvement shield. In addition to giving people the option of putting more distance between 
themselves and others, cars also serve as personal cocoons that protect occupants from 
unappealing social encounters in transit (Ito, Okabe, & Anderson, 2009; Lofland, 1973).  
Together, communication and transportation innovations have increased people’s social 
autonomy by enhancing their capacity for social interactions with desired partners, and by 
facilitating their ability to ignore, barricade, and distance themselves from undesirable partners.   
 Of course, the availability of social autonomy-enhancing communication and 
transportation technologies varies across people and places. In general, these technologies are 
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most accessible to people of relatively high socioeconomic status within regions of the world 
with advanced communication and transportation infrastructures. However, although it is 
reasonable to conclude that economic wealth is a strong and perhaps the strongest predictor of 
social autonomy across cultures, it is not clear that communication and transportation advances 
have magnified the relevance of wealth for social autonomy. Wealthy people have always had 
more ability to wall themselves off from undesirable others (e.g., Graham & Marvin, 2001; 
Lofland, 1973) and more opportunity to connect with people beyond their immediate physical 
environment (e.g., Chen & Miller, 2012). Restriction by others has always been more of a 
problem than restriction by self for people of low wealth and status. Nonetheless, increased 
access to the modern tools of social autonomy has elevated the social autonomy of some low-
income individuals (see Mehra, Merkel, & Bishop, 2004 for compatible evidence of technology 
advances benefitting people of low socioeconomic status). Wealthy people still have more 
reliable access to these social autonomy tools (e.g., see evidence of the “digital divide”; Pearce & 
Rice, 2013; Zickuhr, 2013), but in some places, smartphones and cars could be construed as 
baseline necessities even for people living in relative poverty. In sum, it is fair to view social 
autonomy as most consistently accessible to relatively wealthy people, but the relevance of 
socioeconomic status for social autonomy should decline if new communication and 
transportation options continue to proliferate beyond the wealthy. Next, we explore the behavior 
that social autonomy promotes. 
How People Use Their Social Autonomy 
Communication and transportation advances have increased people’s social autonomy, 
and we argue that people are likely to use it to reduce their exposure to unappealing interpersonal 
encounters in favor of spending time with individuals who make them feel comfortable. It is not 
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much of a leap to conclude that people generally feel most comfortable in the presence of 
kindred spirits—a term depicting collective membership in a cluster of certain ingroup categories 
that we use to describe people who share similar attitudes, passions, experience, and 
worldviews.4 The concept of homophily (“birds of a feather flock together”) is a cornerstone 
principle of social psychology (e.g., Festinger, 1954; Mackinnon, Jordan, & Wilson, 2011; 
McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; Reis, Maniaci, Caprariello, Eastwick, & Finkel, 2011). 
In line with this contention, prior research has repeatedly confirmed that the more social 
autonomy people have, the more likely they are to gravitate toward kindred spirits and away 
from dissimilar, unfamiliar people (e.g., Bahns, Pickett, & Crandall, 2012; Fischer, 1982; 
Jackson et al., 1991; Lin & Lundquist, 2013; Motyl, Iyer, Oishi, Trawalter, & Nosek, 2014; 
Oishi, Miao, Koo, Kisling, & Ratliff, 2012; Rosenbaum, 1986). Such behavior is entirely 
rational, considering that when people interact with dissimilar others the initial consequences 
sometimes include communication problems (Greenaway, Wright, Willingham, Reynolds, & 
Haslam, 2015) and elevated levels of general dissatisfaction and anxiety (e.g., Plant & Devine, 
2003; Seder & Oishi, 2009; Shook & Fazio, 2008a; Trawalter, Richeson, & Shelton, 2009). 
Figure 2 provides an abstract representation of the difference between the social networks 
of people with lower social autonomy (the historical norm) and people with higher social 
autonomy. Equipped with tools for social bridging and blocking, people with higher social 
autonomy mostly interact with kindred spirits who may or may not be geographically proximal, 
whereas people with lower social autonomy tend to interact with people in their immediate 
physical environment who may or may not be kindred spirits. The claim that people with more 
social autonomy spend a greater proportion of their social interactions with kindred spirits might 
seem to contradict research indicating that social networking via internet promotes more 
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exposure to diversity than traditional forms of networking (e.g., Hampton, Lee, & Her, 2011; 
Hergovich & Ortega, 2018; Rice, Shepherd, Dutton, & Katz, 2007), but these perspectives are 
not necessarily in conflict. Exposure to online information makes people aware of a wider range 
of possibilities, but access to more information also gives people more capacity to zero in on 
their preferred options without having to settle for something less ideal. To wit: The internet 
seems to be increasing people’s exposure to diverse ideological opinions (e.g., Gentzkow & 
Shapiro, 2011; Lee, Choi, Kim, & Kim, 2014) but claiming that ideological polarization has 
waned as a result would be a hard sell in the current international political climate.  
We agree that the internet should reduce the relevance of certain traditional markers of 
social segregation such as those based on geography or on physical appearance cues—at least to 
the extent that these cues are not relevant or evident online. For example, Hutson, Taft, Barocas, 
and Levy (2018) proposed that unconscious forms of racial bias reflected in online dating 
patterns could be reduced by intentionally eliminating racial cues from matchmaking services’ 
online profiles. Nonetheless, the internet clearly helps people identify and interact with others 
who share their experience, interests, and values (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Brashears, 2006; 
Wimmer & Lewis, 2010). Online forms of social networking give people more ability to select 
social connections on the basis of personal characteristics that rationally should affect 
relationship compatibility. In other words, the internet facilitates social discrimination of a form 
that aligns more closely with the values and priorities of the person making the judgment and 
less closely with factors not viewed as important by the person making the judgment. This point 
should be considered when reviewing evidence of internet effects on social network 
homogeneity—superficial, easy-to-measure markers of heterogeneity may disguise underlying 
bonds based on shared features. 
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The selective socializing that social autonomy enables does not necessarily reflect 
conscious decision-making; people automatically gravitate toward people they resemble (e.g., 
Bailenson, Iyengar, Yee, & Collins, 2008; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, & 
Mirenberg, 2004). To a degree, people want to think of themselves as unique individuals (see 
review by Leonardelli, Pickett, & Brewer, 2010), especially in individualistic Western cultures 
(e.g., Kim & Markus, 1999), but people are capable of feeling unique in the company of social 
companions who share much in common (e.g., Mullen & Hu, 1989; Suls & Wan, 1987). It is true 
that people often acknowledge and celebrate the educational and experiential value of encounters 
with people with different viewpoints and backgrounds, but when people are given a choice 
between a comfortable interaction with a kindred spirit or a less predictable encounter with a 
dissimilar, unfamiliar person, most take the more comfortable option in most situations (e.g., 
Paolini, Wright, Dys-Steenbergen, & Favara, 2016). People’s preference for interacting with 
those to whom they can easily relate can be viewed as an impulse that is now less constrained by 
environmental reality. Even for people who appreciate the benefits of exposure to social 
diversity, choosing such exposure in moment-to-moment daily living would likely require 
swimming upstream against their natural inclinations.  
To be sure, similarity-seeking is not an inevitable consequence of social autonomy; the 
homophily norm has exceptions and qualifications (e.g., Heine, Foster, & Spina, 2009; Norton, 
Frost, & Ariely, 2007). For example, people privileged with social autonomy may choose to visit 
foreign countries to intentionally embrace the experience of sharing space with unfamiliar people 
in an exotic culture, though the attraction of such experiences should depend upon the limited 
duration of the social exposure and the assurance of maintained social autonomy. Cultural 
tourists who merely dip their toes in an unfamiliar social environment will not likely encounter 
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challenges substantial enough to require real adaptation (e.g., Winkelman, 1994). Nonetheless, 
people are sometimes drawn to novel social experiences even when they expect the experience 
will be less enjoyable than familiar alternatives (e.g., Ratner, Kahn, & Kahneman, 1999).  
People are especially likely to seek or at least not run from social challenges if they are 
extraverted, sensation-seeking, and approach-oriented (e.g., Aron, Norman, & Aron, 1998; 
Mattingly, McIntyre, & Lewandowski, 2012; Paolini et al., 2016; Stürmer et al., 2013), 
desperately seeking social connection to satisfy their unmet need to belong (e.g., Maner, DeWall, 
Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007), in situations that give them reason to expect that initially 
threatening social encounters will develop into desirable relationships (e.g., Aron, Steele, 
Kashdan, & Perez, 2006), or considering abstract, psychologically distant social possibilities 
(e.g., Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006; Kross & Grossmann, 2012). However, 
though certain people may seek out social challenges under certain circumstances, we propose 
that similarity-seeking steers the social choices of the majority of people in the majority of 
contexts. Novel experiences are inviting when the risk of psychological discomfort is small—
smaller than the risk most people associate with unfamiliar social adventures. As such, we 
suggest those who use their social autonomy to pursue social challenges would constitute a 
minority subset of the general population.  
How Social Autonomy Harms Social Adaptability  
We have explained our contentions that social autonomy has become more accessible and 
that people use their social autonomy to seek comfortable social interactions. Now we turn our 
attention to the consequences. The SSR model highlights antagonism between social autonomy 
and social adaptability. As individuals use their social autonomy to select easy, familiar, and 
unchallenging experiences, they undermine their ability to adapt to difficult, novel, and 
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challenging situations. As Figure 1 conveys, the SSR model proposes that the inverse 
relationship between social autonomy and social adaptability is mediated by social challenge 
avoidance.  
The SSR model could be framed as a variant of the what-doesn’t-kill-you-makes-you-
stronger axiom. Historically, models of adaptability have emphasized how challenging prior life 
experiences can harm individuals’ ability to respond to current life challenges (Fletcher & 
Sarkar, 2013), but difficult experiences can clearly benefit people as well (see reviews by 
Dienstbier, 1989; Joseph & Linley, 2006; MacInnis & Page-Gould, 2015; Updegraff & Taylor, 
2000). In fact, those who experience moderately stressful experiences from time to time have 
been found to be healthier than those who live highly stressful lives and those who somehow 
manage to escape noteworthy stressors altogether (e.g., Neff & Broady, 2011; see reviews by 
Liu, 2015; Seery, Holman, & Silver, 2010). The SSR model extends this point by proposing that 
social autonomy leads people to limit their exposure to unplanned, unwanted, and unpredictable 
interactions, which renders them less capable of coping when forced to face such social 
challenges. 
To be clear, some social contexts pose challenges that are too profound to overcome—
worthwhile outcomes are essentially unattainable within these contexts, regardless of one’s 
social skills or experience. For example, in a particular culture, it might be futile for a member of 
a stigmatized social group to strive for assimilation with others whose beliefs justify denigrating, 
exploiting, or physically assaulting that person. Conflicts between personal habits or intractable 
ideologies could be severe enough to prevent social adaptation. Social empowerment entails 
openness to pushing past perceived social boundaries that may prove arbitrary or irrelevant, but 
it does not preclude appropriate social avoidance or withdrawal. 
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Social adaptability development in the SSR model corresponds with how people respond 
to contact with outgroup members. MacInnis and Page-Gould (2015) observed that different 
outcomes are expected at different points in time during the extended experience of contact with 
outgroup members. Research that focuses on people’s initial engagement with outgroup 
members tends to document anxiety and other forms of psychological discomfort people 
experience—outcomes that can interfere with cognitive capacities, strengthen intergroup 
prejudice, and justify outgroup avoidance (e.g., Mendes, Blascovich, Lickel, & Hunter, 2002; 
Plant & Devine, 2003; Trawalter et al., 2009; Wilder, 1993). This research reinforces the SSR 
model’s message that people with social autonomy are unlikely to voluntarily embrace or extend 
social encounters with another individual presumed to be very different or unfamiliar. In 
contrast, research focusing on the long-term outcomes of intergroup relationships usually finds 
that sustained contact between members of historically separated social groups gradually 
diminishes anxiety and intergroup prejudice (e.g., Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & 
Tropp, 2006; see review by Brown & Hewstone, 2005), partly because features viewed as 
outgroup identifiers gradually become assimilated into the set of features associated with the 
ingroup (e.g., Page-Gould, Mendoza-Denton, Alegre, & Siy, 2010). These positive long-term 
effects of outgroup contact reflect symptoms of successful adaptation to social challenges in the 
context of the SSR model. Social challenges are uncomfortable at first, but if exposure to the 
challenge is sustained, comfort levels should rise over time and the benefits of exposure may 
eventually outweigh the costs.  
The practice of selective socializing should reinforce people’s sense that they need to 
avoid social challenges. Because social adaptability is subject to strong self-reinforcement 
effects, people with low social adaptability are likely to remain in that condition as long as they 
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maintain social autonomy. People should be especially likely to seek or at least not shrink from 
social challenges if they already possess the relevant social skills, tolerance, and knowledge 
required for social adaptability. In parallel, people who lack social adaptability are naturally 
more inclined to hide from the social challenges that benefit social adaptability.5  
We will now explain how social challenge avoidance decreases individuals’ social 
adaptability by restricting the development and maintenance of social skills, by heightening 
sensitivity to aversive social situations, and by fostering formation of distorted or paranoid views 
of the people beyond the boundaries of one’s selected social habitat.  
Social challenge avoidance limits social skill development. The SSR model proposes 
that people with social autonomy typically seek to inhabit social environments they can navigate 
confidently while avoiding challenging social circumstances that might push them to widen their 
range of social skills. The idea that social skill development requires exposure to challenges that 
push people beyond the boundaries of their social comfort zone resembles the attachment theory 
perspective that children benefit (i.e., develop “secure” attachment) when their caregiver 
provides a safe and comfortable base, yet also encourages exploration of unfamiliar territory 
beyond this base (e.g., Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Bowlby, 1982). Insecure 
“ambivalent/resistant” children who cling to their caretakers and avoid experiences outside of 
their social comfort zone tend to display lower well-being later in life (see review by Mikulincer 
& Florian, 1998).  
Confidence in one’s ability to adapt appropriately to different contexts is an important 
element of social empowerment. Such confidence is earned through skill-building life 
experiences (e.g., Tarique & Takeuchi, 2008), though it may also emerge without justification. 
People who perpetually occupy protected social cocoons may not recognize their social skill 
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deficits if they never confront the types of social challenges that expose their deficiencies. To the 
extent that selective socializers are unaware of the extent to which their social skills are 
underdeveloped, their ignorance might allow them to feel open to the hypothetical possibility of 
exploring worlds beyond their social cocoons; however, this unwarranted confidence would only 
be empowering to the extent that it encouraged social exploration that confronted people with the 
inadequacy of their social skills—an uncomfortable experience that should lead to immediate 
retreat for people with choice. Experiencing social challenges does not guarantee development of 
useful social skills, but it should improve the odds by teaching people to identify relevant social 
cues, consider various options, engage in problem solving, and evaluate the efficacy of their 
responses. The research literature on social skill erosion is thin (see Beauchamp & Anderson, 
2010), but it seems reasonable to speculate that the use-it-or-lose-it principle applies to social 
skill maintenance, at least to a degree. Unfortunately, social autonomy tempts people to avoid the 
types of experiences that would help them develop and maintain a diverse and well-honed set of 
social skills, an outcome that further reinforces motivation to avoid people’s desire to avoid 
social challenges.  
Social challenge avoidance promotes intolerance of social discomfort. To reap the 
potential benefits of social diversity exposure, people must endure inevitable discomfort in the 
process. Even if one’s social skills are insufficient to improve the social dynamics of an 
unpleasant situation, the ability to merely tolerate undesirable social realities is an important part 
of social empowerment. Whereas social skills help people to actively cope by changing their 
situation through personal behavior, tolerance of social discomfort constitutes passive coping. 
The value of capacity for passive discomfort tolerance is supported by research related to the 
principles of hedonic adaptation (e.g., Helson, 1964; Lyubomirsky, 2011), inoculation and 
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exposure therapy (e.g., Meichenbaum & Deffenbacher, 1988), hardiness (e.g., Bartone, Kelly, & 
Matthews, 2013; Kobasa, 1979), and resilience (e.g., Seery, Leo, Lupien, Kondrak, & Almonte, 
2013). People typically adapt and become emotionally desensitized after extended exposure to a 
situation that initially induced moderate pain or distress (e.g., Carnagey, Anderson, & Bushman, 
2007; Suh, Diener, & Fujita, 1996), in part because the experience gradually becomes more 
predictable (e.g., Mendes, Blascovich, Hunter, Lickel, & Jost, 2007; Page-Gould, Mendes, & 
Major, 2010). This form of adaptation is a problem in that it reduces people’s motivation to 
escape or improve a bad situation (e.g., Bushman & Anderson, 2009; Seligman, 1972). However, 
desensitization is also a fundamentally desirable, if not crucial, process to the extent that 
individuals lack the resources to change the situation and they cannot or should not avoid 
exposure to that situation. 
Social challenge avoidance promotes distorted social perceptions. The adaptability 
problem that social autonomy can foster extends beyond discomfort with realities experienced 
upon leaving one’s zone of personal control. Selective socializing increases the odds that people 
will have unjustifiably negative appraisals of the social situations they avoid. Successful social 
adaptability should benefit from ability, honed through exposure to not-so-attractive social 
environments, to recognize the subtle norms of unique social and cultural contexts and to 
develop empathy for the people in those contexts. Over time, as people develop social skills, 
tolerance, and understanding of the people and events within a specific context, they should 
come to view moderately challenging social situations as relatively routine, manageable, and 
unthreatening (e.g., Florack, Rohmann, Palcu, & Mazziotta, 2014; Stephens, Hamedani, & 
Townsend, in press). This outcome does not represent distorted thinking; instead, it reflects the 
reality of the match between people’s coping capacities and the actual circumstances they face. 
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In contrast, chronic avoidance of social challenges cultivates appraisals of social challenges that 
have less connection to reality. Moreover, when people rarely leave the comfort of their social 
cocoon, the experience of doing so is likely to violate their naïve expectancies, which should 
increase feelings of threat (e.g., Mendes et al., 2007) and may push them to retreat to their social 
safety zone before they have sufficient opportunity to adapt to the unfamiliar social environment. 
A consequence of habitually restricting one’s social experiences to certain categories of 
people and social environments is predicted by the habituation principle of perceptual adaptation: 
Decreasing frequency of exposure to a particular stimulus increases the subsequent intensity of 
response to that stimulus. Hence, the event of encountering people one has avoided in the past is 
likely to produce a relatively strong psychological response. Social psychology research clarifies 
that this strong response is likely to entail cognitive processing biased toward focusing on 
differences rather than similarities between oneself and the others—an outcome that reinforces 
the avoidance that led to the outcome (Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002; Mussweiler, Rüter, & 
Epstude, 2004), causing people to hold more pessimistic views of the unfamiliar people they are 
separated from (e.g., Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001; Hamilton & 
Gifford, 1976; Sandseter & Kennair, 2011; Shelton & Richeson, 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 
1985). Sustained social segregation should further magnify people’s tendency to overestimate the 
extent to which outgroups are dissimilar to them (e.g., Mallett, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2008; Shelton 
& Richeson, 2005), homogeneous (Judd, Ryan, & Park, 1991; Park & Rothbart, 1982), 
untrustworthy (Cao, Galinsky, & Maddux, 2014; Fetchenhauer & Dunning, 2010), and 
disinterested in making new acquaintances (Shelton & Richeson, 2005). People who can satisfy 
their need to belong exclusively through their relationships with kindred spirits may even be 
more prone to dehumanize dissimilar others (Waytz & Epley, 2011).   
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 When people use their social autonomy to build a comfortable social cocoon, they risk 
developing paranoid us-versus-them views of the people outside their cocoon. Status quo-
justification thought processes can easily lead people to develop reasons for not leaving their 
cocoons (e.g., Levin, van Laar, & Sidanius, 2003; see review by Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004), 
just as the mere presence of a privacy fence could cause neighborhood residents to feel more 
threatened by those on other side of the fence (Blakely & Snyder, 1997; Ellin, 1997; Low, 2003). 
The result is a loss of social adaptability, expressed by the inability to distinguish legitimately 
scary people and places from those that seem threatening but are essentially benign.  
In addition to introducing unnecessary negative emotions, the paranoia that social 
avoidance can breed may also cause people to miss out on compelling and enjoyable 
experiences. When outgroup cultures start to become more familiar, people tend to show more 
interest in them (Brannon & Walton, 2013). Epley and Schroeder (2014) found that people 
generally experienced more positive emotion when using public transportation (e.g., trains, 
buses, and taxis) when they were induced to engage in brief conversations with strangers, instead 
of remaining quiet and socially detached. Unfortunately, people did not anticipate this outcome, 
which is one reason why they avoided initiating conversations with strangers in public when they 
had an alternative option to choose social detachment.  
Integrating the SSR Model with Self-determination and Self-expansion Research 
The SSR model adds needed balance to the autonomy literature in psychology, which has 
traditionally highlighted the virtues of autonomy while neglecting the virtues of adaptability (see 
conclusions drawn by Chen & Miller, 2012; Kashdan, 2010; McNulty & Fincham, 2012; 
Morling & Evered, 2006; Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). Adaptability neglect in 
psychological scholarship probably partly reflects the reality that most research takes place in the 
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context of individualistic Western cultures that value personal autonomy more than adaptability 
(Boiger, Mesquita, Tsai, & Markus, 2012; Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984). It may also 
reflect the control-and-predict orientation of the research culture itself or the relatively privileged 
backgrounds of the most scholars and their prototypical student research participants (e.g., 
Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).  
As we have noted, although the SSR model focuses on a problem associated with social 
autonomy, we do not claim the disadvantages of social autonomy outweigh the advantages. If the 
disadvantages were profoundly problematic, they would presumably be highly salient to the 
people engaging in social self-restriction and perhaps to observers of those individuals. The lack 
of attention paid to social autonomy disadvantages in the psychology research literature suggests 
that these disadvantages are not glaringly obvious. To a large extent, individuals’ increased 
ability to find their kind and reduce their exposure to unappealing others is a development worth 
celebrating. Personal autonomy in any form is a widely cherished human value, and for good 
reason. Empirical evidence of strong positive associations between personal autonomy and 
markers of psychological and physical well-being is easy to locate (see research on locus of 
control [e.g., Lefcourt, 1966], learned helplessness [e.g., Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993], 
and psychological reactance [e.g., Brehm & Brehm, 1981]). Moreover, when contemplating the 
consequences of personal autonomy in social contexts, it is hard to challenge the outlook that life 
is short and therefore people should try to spend their social time with people they understand 
and enjoy, and avoid settling for less comfortable interactions with less familiar people.  
Social autonomy also allows people to adopt a conservative, better-safe-than-sorry social 
orientation to reduce unintentional exposure to the people in their society who are truly 
dangerous or merely annoying. Inability to escape such unwanted social exposure has often been 
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linked with negative psychological and physical health outcomes (e.g., Baum, Aiello, & 
Calesnick, 1978; Halpern, 1995). For example, socioemotional selectivity theory (Carstensen, 
Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999; Charles & Carstensen, 2009) proposes that younger adults report 
more negative emotions than older adults because their social encounters are relatively more 
likely to involve unpredictable, stressful interactions with unfamiliar people.  
The benefits of autonomy in general have been thoroughly established over two decades 
of research inspired by self-determination theory (SDT; Ryan & Deci, 2000), which proposes 
that people are fundamentally driven to satisfy three basic psychological needs: autonomy, 
competence, and relatedness to others. SDT defines autonomy as one’s capacity to exercise self-
directed volition without influence from external pressures (Deci & Ryan, 2002, 2012; Knee & 
Uysal, 2010). SDT emphasizes that people who view their lives as self-directed have better 
mental health and achieve more than people who lack autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 2000, 2002; 
Ryan & Deci, 2006). In comparison, SSR can be viewed as an extension of and a caveat to the 
SDT message that autonomy is a human need. Specifically, the SSR model adds the qualification 
that gaining autonomy does not represent the end-game achievement of empowerment. People 
cannot attain social empowerment without sufficient social autonomy, but we argue that social 
autonomy leads people to make choices that restrict their perceived and real freedom to explore 
the full range of their social opportunities. 
SDT further complements the SSR model in proposing that attaining satisfactory levels of 
all three needs is critical for individuals to function optimally, and that striving to satisfy one of 
the three basic needs can interfere with the achievement of another need (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 
2014). For example, parents may offer their children conditional regard such that they withhold 
love and support when their children act inappropriately. In this way, children must sacrifice 
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some autonomy to act in accordance with their parents’ wishes in order to satisfy their 
relatedness needs that comes from parental affection (Deci & Ryan, 2014). The SSR model 
describes an additional and important way in which these basic psychological needs may 
conflict: People’s desire to seek and use autonomy to establish meaningful connections with 
others in the social environments where they feel most competent ultimately can interfere with 
their ability to develop social skills and competencies that will help them in other, less 
controllable, social contexts. In other words, our model highlights how autonomous striving for 
relatedness and competence can restrict people’s exposure to the types of challenging 
experiences that help people develop capacity to feel competent across a wide variety of social 
situations. In summary, the SSR model affirms the advantages of autonomy highlighted by SDT, 
but it focuses on an underappreciated disadvantage. SDT captures the advantages people enjoy 
within the boundaries of their chosen social habitats, whereas SSR highlights opportunities 
missed when people restrict their social explorations.  
The unique elements of the SSR model are also clarified through comparison with the 
self-expansion model (e.g., Aron & Aron, 1997; Aron, Aron, & Norman, 2001; Aron, 
Lewandowski, Mashek, & Aron, 2013), which argues that people have a strong motivation to 
seek new relationships and novel experiences, social or otherwise. Self-expansion refers to the 
growth and cognitive restructuring of the self-concept (e.g., through including-the-other-in-the-
self processes) that occurs when individuals obtain traits, resources, perspectives, and skills 
through new experiences (e.g., Aron et al., 2004; McIntyre, Mattingly, Lewandowski, & 
Simpson, 2014). The self-expansion model emphasizes that people experience positive emotions 
(Strong & Aron, 2006), gain self-efficacy (Mattingly & Lewandowski, 2013), and increase their 
self-esteem (Aron, Paris, & Aron, 1995) when they self-expand—a point similar to the SSR 
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model’s emphasis that social exposure helps people feel comfortable and confident in a wider 
range of social circumstances.  
Yet, whereas the self-expansion model proposes that individuals seek out self-expansion 
opportunities, the SSR model asserts that, in moment-to-moment daily living, people’s desire to 
avoid discomfort should override their willingness to seek self-expansion (see also 
Harasymchuk, Cloutier, Peetz, & Lebreton, 2017). This position is difficult to square with strong 
articulations of the self-expansion model suggesting that desire to self-expand is a fundamental 
human motivation, perhaps powerful enough to compete with motivations to seek food and 
safety (e.g., Aron et al., 1998). Nonetheless, as a whole, the self-expansion literature appears to 
align with our perspective. Specifically, the self-expansion literature clarifies that people seek 
self-expansion opportunities that can be had without enduring substantial social challenges. For 
example, Aron and colleagues (e.g., Aron et al., 2001, 2006) have proposed that self-expansion 
motivation leads people to seek social partners who do not seem radically different, because 
relationships rooted in shared commonality are more likely to survive and deepen over time, 
thereby increasing the opportunity to expand one’s self-concept through absorption of a partner’s 
traits. This implies that motivation for social self-expansion normally involves interest in 
exposure to novel but comfortable social experiences that would probably not serve as useful 
rehearsal for confronting unfamiliar social situations beyond one’s comfort zone. In other words, 
the types of self-expanding social experiences that test and build social adaptability are unlikely 
to result from the intentional exercise of social autonomy.  
Distinguishing SSR from Other Outcomes of Selective Socializing 
The SSR model puts a spotlight on a potential self-limiting downside of selective 
socializing that deserves more attention, but our focus on SSR and its implications does not 
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imply that the importance of the SSR problem approaches the importance of other documented 
problems associated with forms of social balkanization that can spread from the selective 
socializing that social autonomy enables. Furthermore, our argument that people may harm 
themselves by exercising ability to limit their social exposure is not unprecedented. When people 
make decisions that promote social balkanization, as reflected in residential segregation and in 
polarized attitudes, they may hurt themselves by eroding the stabilizing connections between 
different communities and cultures that benefit the progress, prosperity, and safety of their 
society as a whole (e.g., Atkinson & Flint, 2004; Bishop & Cushing, 2008; Jacobs, 1961; Stroud, 
2010; Van Alstyne & Brynjolfsson, 2005).  
The message of the SSR model regarding outcomes of enhanced social autonomy should 
not be confused with the incompatible claim that people in recent decades have become more 
isolated, paranoid, and lonely because they have more capacity to wall themselves off from 
others (e.g., Bugeja, 2005; Olds & Schwartz, 2009). First, we contest the validity of the claim of 
rising loneliness in the modern world because some evidence suggests that loneliness may 
actually be declining (Clark, Loxton, & Tobin, 2015) and other evidence indicates that powerful 
people (who presumably possess more social autonomy) are less likely to report feeling lonely 
and more likely to report a feeling of belonging (Waytz, Chou, Magee, & Galinsky, 2015). 
Second, the SSR model emphasizes that people can satisfy their social needs through networks 
of substantial size despite walling themselves off from certain people or social environments. 
Instead of feeling lonely, people with social autonomy should be more likely to experience 
satiation—a feeling that should discourage people from leaving their comfort zone to seek 
challenging social experiences that could benefit their social adaptability (for evidence that social 
satiation may be easily achieved, see Baumeister & Leary, 1995; DeWall, Baumeister, & Vohs, 
SOCIAL SELF-RESTRICTION     27 
 
2008). Attaining social relationship contentment is surely an ideal worth striving for, but the SSR 
model highlights a secondary problem: Achieving contentment may narrow people’s social 
comfort zone.  
Future Research Potential 
The SSR model’s novel perspectives and testable hypotheses have high potential to 
influence ideas and inspire new research. By bringing attention to social psychological concepts 
and processes that have not previously received direct research attention, the model can inform 
and shape relevant social dialogue going forward. Beyond changing the conversation, the model 
also provides a template for conducting studies to test its straightforward predictions regarding 
why and how social autonomy threatens social adaptability. Testing these predictions requires a 
research design that can account for each of the four boxes represented in Figure 1. This design 
would include measurement of social autonomy (the predictor variable), dimensions of social 
adaptability (the dependent variable), social challenge avoidance (the mediator), and personal 
traits and situational states that could affect social challenge orientation (moderator variables). 
To provide an example of how the SSR model’s components and hypothesized effects could be 
defined and measured, we will describe a sketch of a hypothetical study designed to test the 
effects of roommate selection autonomy on college students’ social behavior and attitudes.  
Measuring social autonomy. In our sample study, students’ level of social autonomy 
would depend on the manipulated method of their college dormitory roommate assignment. 
Students would be labeled as having high autonomy if they chose their roommates on the basis 
of profiles that might contain information about physical appearance, personal background, 
personality traits, interests, attitudes, and values. These students would be compared with 
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students labeled as having low autonomy because they were randomly assigned to their 
roommates.  
Ideally, the power and internal validity of the social autonomy group comparison would 
be maximized by randomly assigning students to one of the two roommate selection conditions 
rather than comparing students from colleges with different roommate assignment policies. 
Unfortunately, this experimental approach might not be feasible because college students and 
college administrations would probably object to the risk of random assignment to undesirable 
roommates. College students want to live comfortably, and they have leverage because college 
administrators are loath to repel prospective students (Bauer-Wolf, 2018; Wheeler, 2014).  
Measuring social challenge avoidance. We predict high autonomy students would avoid 
social challenge and seek comfort by choosing roommates with features resembling participants’ 
characteristics. In comparison, low autonomy students would be more likely to be paired with 
roommates who pose challenges for comfortable coexistence. The extent to which roommates 
feel comfortable or challenged would be assessed through self-report and other-report measures. 
Measuring social adaptability. We predict high autonomy students would display lower 
social adaptability than low autonomy students because the low autonomy students would be 
more likely to have improved their social skills, tolerance, and understanding by confronting 
roommate-related social challenges they could not avoid. The social adaptability of these 
students should grow from living with roommates they did not choose, and through the larger 
social consequences of random roommate exposure—relationships developed through 
coincidental contact with their roommates’ friends, and through other forms of social contact 
diversification resulting from the gradual expansion of their social comfort zones. Assessment of 
the skills, tolerance, and understanding comprising social adaptability could take the form of 
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self-report and other-report measures and behavioral observation within social contexts 
constructed for that purpose. Of all the elements of the SSR model, social adaptability outcomes 
present the greatest challenge for investigators to assess because adaptability change in either 
direction should occur slowly over time. Social adaptability change resulting from social 
challenge avoidance would be difficult to detect conclusively without using a longitudinal 
design.  
Measuring moderators of social challenge avoidance. We predict individual difference 
variables and situational factors would influence the effect of the social autonomy manipulation. 
Students with high scores on self-report measures of personality traits associated with high social 
competence and low social interaction anxiety should be less prone to using social autonomy to 
make self-restricting social choices; thus we predict these students would be less affected by 
their roommate selection condition than students oriented toward socializing more selectively. In 
the context of the random roommate study, an example of a situational state moderator of social 
challenge avoidance could take the form of instructions given to students in the social autonomy 
condition. Students prompted to reflect upon the downsides of selective socializing and the 
benefits of social adaptability could conceivably be less prone to choosing roommates who most 
closely resemble themselves, although such instructions would probably have more impact if the 
study involved a social choice with less consequential implications than college roommate 
selection.  
The hypothetical study we have proposed to test the SSR model builds upon prior 
investigations of the effects of random college roommate assignment on social behavior and 
attitudes (e.g., Carrell, Hoekstra, & West, 2015; Gaither & Sommers, 2013; Mark & Harris, 
2012; Shook & Fazio, 2008b). Instead of comparing differences between roommates chosen and 
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roommates randomly assigned as our sample study recommends, these prior studies have 
typically tested differences between same-race and cross-race roommates within colleges that 
randomly assign roommates. The results of these previous studies align with the predictions of 
the SSR model. Cross-race roommate pairings should theoretically present a higher social 
challenge than same-race roommate pairings, and the research confirms that cross-race 
roommates are comparatively more dissatisfied and uncomfortable with their living 
arrangements. However, random assignment to cross-race roommates also predicts symptoms of 
social adaptability growth, exemplified by cross-race roommates’ comparatively low prejudice 
toward the race of their roommates and greater likelihood of establishing additional cross-race 
relationships. 
Concluding Thoughts 
This paper opens a new window for examining social empowerment and the variables on 
which it depends. Our SSR model introduces novel concepts and highlights understudied 
connections in challenging the perspective that autonomy and empowerment are one in the same. 
Grant and Schwartz (2011) called for heightened recognition of too-much-of-a-good-thing 
effects in psychology; we have followed their directive in identifying maladaptive aspects of 
social autonomy. Making the best use of one’s social autonomy requires recognizing its potential 
pitfalls. The SSR model should raise awareness and prompt empirical investigation of the 
historically undervalued status of social adaptability and the empowerment it provides.  
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Figure 1: Predictions of the social self-restriction model.  
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Figure 2. Representation of the social networks of hypothetical people with lower or higher 
social autonomy. Spatial distance between symbols represents geographic proximity.   
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Footnotes 
1 Our definitions of social autonomy and social adaptability bear some resemblance to the 
concepts of primary control and secondary control, respectively (e.g., Rothbaum et al., 1982; see 
review by Morling & Evered, 2006). Elements of social adaptability also overlap partially with 
the constructs of self-monitoring (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Snyder, 1974) and cultural 
intelligence (Ang & Van Dyne, 2008; Ang, Van Dyne, & Rockstuhl, 2016). However, the central 
theme of the SSR model—that exercising control over one’s own social habitat tends to reduce 
one’s ability to adapt when they lack this control—has no parallel in the research literature. 
2 The SSR model focuses narrowly on the causal relationship between social autonomy 
and social adaptability, in the direction of social autonomy causing change in social adaptability. 
The model does not address the possibility of a reverse causal effect (social adaptability causing 
change in social autonomy), but we acknowledge this possibility. For example, high adaptability 
may benefit social autonomy to the extent that adaptability helps people build social connections 
that are particularly difficult to establish. 
3 Putnam (2000) used the term “bridging” to refer to an extension of one’s social network 
to new and different contacts—a relatively bold and desirable form of socializing he framed as 
the opposite of “bonding,” a less-adventurous form socializing that involves interacting with 
people one already knows. In contrast, we use the bridging term to describe a mechanism for 
bonding. The bridge metaphor fits the SSR model well in the sense that people with social 
autonomy can use social bridges to pass over the people they find unappealing.   
4 Our use of the kindred spirits concept conflates similarity and familiarity, an approach 
justified by evidence that perceived similarity begets perceived familiarity and vice versa (e.g., 
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Moreland & Zajonc, 1982). We acknowledge that the social magnetism of similarity and 
familiarity may not be equivalent in strength or primacy (e.g., Alves, Koch, & Unkelbach, 2016).   
5 Although social adaptability is framed as the outcome of social autonomy in the SSR 
model, some representation of social adaptability also merits inclusion in the list of individual 
difference variables that should moderate the predicted relationship between social autonomy 
and social challenge avoidance. 
 
